Midnight’s public post says perpetual positions no longer have to be public. It is a project statement about a particular privacy property, not a demonstration that every connected service conceals all user activity. The distinction matters because a position, an account identifier and a request sent to a server are different pieces of information. Protecting one does not automatically protect the others.
A practical privacy assessment starts by naming an observer. Another trader, a relayer, a wallet provider and a website operator may see different records. A system can hide a position from the public ledger while still revealing timing or connection information elsewhere. Useful documentation should explain those boundaries without requiring a player to interpret the word private as an unlimited guarantee.
Polygon’s separate public revenue announcement addresses a different question: measured network activity over a stated period. That figure cannot establish the privacy of a particular application, nor does it establish how many distinct people used it. Combining privacy claims with impressive operating totals can obscure both subjects. The first needs a threat model; the second needs definitions, measurement windows and a clear account of what was counted.
Xai’s gas-subsidy documentation describes sponsored transactions and signed requests that can reduce payment friction. Sponsorship is not anonymity. An integration would still need to explain what its relayer receives, what the user signs and what remains onchain. For Night Ash this is a possible design path, not a currently deployed privacy product. Convenience should not be promoted as a security property it does not provide.
The browser interface is part of the same responsibility. It should distinguish permission to submit an action from permission to retain unrelated personal data. A failed request should not prompt the user to grant broader authority merely to continue. Recovery, revocation and a clear account of retained information can matter more than an elegant first-run screen. Each control should have a purpose that survives a plain-language explanation.
The next credible privacy milestone would identify both a protected disclosure and an exposure that remains. If the design cannot state its limits, reviewers cannot tell whether a test has succeeded. Selective protection can still be useful and commercially valuable without being absolute. That narrower, testable claim offers a firmer foundation than combining network totals, frictionless access and the word private into a single promise.