Pool security advice does not establish a new compromise

A message advised participants who believed their pool had been compromised to consider withdrawing and moving elsewhere. It distinguished assets held in contracts from the risk that the operator would stop running the pool. The displayed extract does not identify its author, and its conditional wording does not confirm a new wallet theft on this date. Its assurance about funds is not a substitute for checking contract and wallet exposure. A separate participant reported less frequent rewards after the staking change; that report is not a network-wide frequency measurement.

Later, a Xai administrator explained that a participant could keep an individual node running alongside the pool operator. The explanation explicitly limited that backup to the participant's own key, not every key in the pool, and said eligible rewards would still enter the pool's distribution. This clarifies the proposed backup scope and accounting destination. It does not demonstrate that failover was tested, that rewards were recovered or that Night Ash operated a node or pool.