Back to collectionWallet-recovery limits and backup-node guidance
Responding to a participant who alleged interference with redemptions after a wallet compromise, a Xai administrator said the team had no access to the wallet and would never request wallet access or a private key. The participant asked about adding two-factor authentication. The administrator acknowledged the feedback but said no solution for a compromised wallet was available at that moment. The participant then requested a private ticket review of a proposed solution; the proposal itself is not disclosed in this exchange.
Responding to a participant who alleged interference with redemptions after a wallet compromise, a Xai administrator said the team had no access to the wallet and would never request wallet access or a private key. The participant asked about adding two-factor authentication. The administrator acknowledged the feedback but said no solution for a compromised wallet was available at that moment. The participant then requested a private ticket review of a proposed solution; the proposal itself is not disclosed in this exchange.
These replies establish the support position at the time, not a permanent technical impossibility, a verified loss or a completed recovery. A request for an additional control is not evidence that the control was implemented or would have prevented the reported incident. The public record does not resolve the private ticket. Private-key secrecy remains distinct from ownership verification and any authority a support team actually has over assets.
In a separate exchange, a member asked whether joining a community pool made their own node unnecessary and whether its wallet balance could be recovered. A Xai ambassador advised keeping a node running as a backup even after staking keys in a pool. That reply documents a resilience recommendation, not a wallet-withdrawal procedure or confirmation that funds were returned. It also does not identify a new client version or document a software rollout.