Back to collectionCompromised-wallet report raises a key-recovery question
A holder reported that a compromised wallet contained 108 Sentry Keys and requested an administrative transfer to a new wallet, not a refund. The message acknowledged the keys' non-transferable design and offered identity verification and payment records for a review. It was a security and recovery request from the holder; the report did not independently establish ownership, the mechanism of compromise or the wallet's current control.
A holder reported that a compromised wallet contained 108 Sentry Keys and requested an administrative transfer to a new wallet, not a refund. The message acknowledged the keys' non-transferable design and offered identity verification and payment records for a review. It was a security and recovery request from the holder; the report did not independently establish ownership, the mechanism of compromise or the wallet's current control.
The requested exception was not an approved migration procedure, and the message records no completed reassignment. The operational issue is specific: restricting transfers may make recovery dependent on a separately authorised process when wallet control is lost. A research assessment should therefore distinguish the permanence of an asset binding from the existence of a workable recovery route, without claiming that this individual case ended in either recovery or irreversible loss.